Administrative agencies are in an era of reform. Since the US Supreme Court overturned Chevron deference, the scope of agency authority under the law has been uncertain. Simultaneously, the Trump administration has been pushing for increased efficiency within administrative agencies, issuing directives for streamlined decision making to promote the expansion of American industry. Perhaps surprising within this tumultuous backdrop, the US Supreme Court recently reached an 8-0 consensus related to administrative authority in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, 605 U.S. ____ (2025) (“Seven County”). Something of a departure from trends toward curtailing agency authority and scope, the majority holding promotes judicial deference in the context of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Under NEPA, a federal agency involved with an infrastructure project must consider the environmental impacts of the proposed project; in Seven County, the proposed project is an 88-mile railroad line to be used for oil transport. Construction of railroads necessitates approval by the federal Surface Transportation Board. In weighing the environmental impacts of this proposal over the course of its over 3,600-page analysis, the agency considered direct effects of the project, like increased air pollution and potential impacts to wetlands. It also considered more attenuated effects, like the consequences of increased oil drilling, refining, and traffic in the region. However, it declined to consider certain risks factors which were even further removed, including those related to hypothesized industrial developments related to the railroad. Seven counties in Colorado, along with several environmental organizations, sued the Surface Transportation Board, claiming its potential environmental effects analysis was inadequate in scope and depth. More specifically, they claimed that “reasonably foreseeable impacts” should have been construed more broadly and considered more rigorously. The D.C. Circuit agreed.
On appeal, the US Supreme Court reversed the lower court, providing a fundamental reset concerning the purpose and scope of NEPA, while emphasizing the expansiveness of substantive agency discretion in this context. Justice Kavanaugh penned the majority opinion, describing NEPA as a “legislative acorn” that “has grown over the years into a judicial oak that has hindered infrastructure development ‘under the guise’ of just a little more process” (Seven County at 13). He reminded the reader that “NEPA is a purely procedural statute. Under NEPA, an agency’s only obligation is to prepare an adequate report” (Seven County at 2) (emphasis in original). Consequently, NEPA does not impose substantive requirements and agencies are delegated with the authority to weigh factors as they see fit. Departing from the Loper Bright general rule which prioritizes judicial authority, the majority emphasizes the importance of “substantial judicial deference” to agency decision-making in the context of NEPA. It reads NEPA to explicitly grant agencies with decision making authority, and holds that, in such contexts, courts should defer to reasonable agency action.
As applied to this matter, the parties disputed the degree of attenuated causality an agency is required to consider. The Court held that the focus NEPA is the “proposed action,” described as the “project at hand,” referencing 42 U.S.C § 4332(2)(C) (2018). Again, the Court emphasized agency discretion, holding that “courts should defer to agencies’ decisions regarding where to draw the line” on the contours or reach of the project. (Seven County at 2). Here, specifically, the Court held that the agency was not required to consider factors like the upstream and downstream environmental effects of oil and gas development. The scope of regulatory authority was crucial for the Court; it held that “agencies are not required to analyze the effects of projects over which they do not exercise regulatory authority” (Seven County at 17). This discretionary approach continues in discussion of NEPA remedies. The Court found that, even in instances where an agency’s environmental analysis was too narrow or imperfect, it would be inappropriate to use that flaw in isolation as justification to vacate an agency approval. Though reaching the same conclusion, the concurrence narrows its reasoning to the authority granted to NEPA more specifically, rather than the broader context of executive agencies and the scope of their authority. It emphasizes that agencies are charged under NEPA to consider environmental factors for which they are responsible, not more generalized potential impacts.
In the end, the Court held that agencies are due “substantial deference” in the NEPA context, a contrast to the restriction of agency authority in Loper Bright and an executive push towards limitations of agency authority. Within the narrow context of NEPA, at least, the Court found consensus in upholding agency authority to weigh environmental impacts. The Court opined that NEPA had evolved overtime from “a modest procedural requirement into a blunt and haphazard tool” wielded by those who seek to grind projects to a halt (Seven County at 12); at least within the context of NEPA, the Court held that embracing agency discretion was an appropriate remedy to administrative stagnation. And while the holding itself is narrow, the majority’s discussion indicates that other statutes with similar discretionary mandates could be spaces where it would uphold agency discretion.
